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THE EFFECTS OF CONSTRUAL LEVEL ON STIGMATIZING ATTITUDES TOWARD AN
INDIVIDUAL WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
by
JEREMY G. GAY
(Under the Direction of Karen Z. Naufel)
ABSRACT
People with mental illness often face stigmatization by society. However, little research has
examined cognitive factors that may activate or dissipate stigmatizing attitudes toward those with
mental illness. Construal level, or the extent that people focus on abstract generalizations versus
concrete details of events, may be one such cognitive factor. Two contradictory hypotheses
emerged concerning how construal may affect stigmatizing attitudes. One hypothesis suggests
that abstract construals will decrease stigmatization because abstract construals tend to increase
the activation of similar goals, thus leading to a similarity focus. In contrast, another hypothesis
suggests that abstract construals will increase stigmatization because abstract construals tend to
increase the focus on within group similarities, thus leading to stereotype-consistent
categorizations. Because stereotypes of people with mental illness are largely negative, abstract
primes may lead to stigmatizing attitudes and behavior by decreasing a similarity focus between
the participants and the person with mental illness. To test these competing hypotheses,
participants were primed to think abstractly or concretely and completed self-report and
behavioral measures of stigma. Additionally, participants completed a measure of perceived
similarity with a person with mental illness. Results revealed no significant differences between
construal level on measures of mental illness stigma (attitude and behavioral measures).
Therefore, neither hypothesis was supported. However, exploratory analyses revealed that
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participants who rated themselves as being highly similar to a person with mental illness were
less likely to endorse stigmatizing attitudes toward people with mental illness than participants
who rated themselves as being less similar to a person with mental illness. Future research
should continue examine the role of construal level on mental illness stigma.
INDEX WORDS: Construal level Theory, Stigma, Mental Illness, Stereotypes, Priming, Stigma
Reduction Interventions
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Study Aims and Significance
Although there are many treatments available for most mental disorders, the majority of
individuals diagnosed with a mental disorder do not access mental health care until nearly a
decade after the development of the disorder (Wang, Berglund, Olfson, Pincus, Wells, &
Kessler, 2005). Stigma toward mental illness is a major reason for why people do not seek
treatment for their mental disorder (Schomerus & Angermeyer, 2008) perhaps due to the fear of
negative labels such as “crazy” or “emotionally weak.” (Corrigan & Watson, 2002). Given that
stigma relates to a person’s decisions to seek treatment, a great need exists for evidence-based
practices for reducing stigma.
Unfortunately, research suggests that stigma toward individuals with mental illness is
increasing rather than decreasing, suggesting that improvements still need to be made to reduce
stigma toward mental illness (Pescosolido, Martin, Long, Medina, Phelan, & Link, 2010).
Evidence-based anti-stigma programs may be especially important for those living in rural areas,
where stigma toward those with mental illness is believed to be particularly problematic (Hoyt &
Conger, 1997).
The primary purpose of this study was to objectively identify the extent that a cognitive
mechanism reduces stigmatizing attitudes toward individuals with mental illness. Specifically,
the present study investigated how the cognitive mechanism, construal level, influences the
stigmatization toward a person with mental illness. Construal level theory asserts that people
construe events or object differently in given circumstances, sometimes abstractly and sometimes
concretely (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010).
Specifically, abstract construals are general, unobservable, or broad concepts while concrete
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construals are specific, observable, or discrete concepts (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Construal
level may relate to mental health stigma because negative stereotypes or stigmatizing attitudes
are generalizations, meaning that they are often vague or intangible. Although these descriptions
are often vague, like abstract construals, people often perceive them as providing more
information than more specific descriptions of the group.
This present study is important because few studies have examined cognitive factors that
may activate or dissipate stigmatizing attitudes toward individuals with mental illness. The lack
of literature on potential cognitive factors that may contribute to stigma is problematic,
especially given the need for evidence based anti-stigma campaigns. By better understanding the
cognitive mechanisms that contribute to stigma, researchers and clinicians can develop evidence
based anti-stigma programs. Additionally, this study helped assess the prevalence of stigmatizing
attitudes in rural areas. It is important to assess the prevalence of stigmatizing attitudes in rural
areas because little research has actually examined how prevalent mental health stigma is in rural
areas (Smalley, Yancey, Warren, et al., 2010).
Definition of Terms
Stigma: Stigma refers to negative judgment toward a specific group, characterized by
generalizations, prejudice (negative attitudes), and discrimination (negative behavior toward a
specific group) (Corrigan & Watson, 2002). In the present study, stigma was measured by
assessing negative attitudes toward people with mental illness (AQ-27) as well as stigmatizing
behavior toward a person with mental illness (resource allocation task).
Mental Illness: Mental illness refers to all psychiatric or mental disorders. According to
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2013), mental illnesses are characterized by
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abnormalities in mood, thought, or behavior. Mental illnesses are categorized and defined in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) (APA, 2013).
Construal Level Theory (CLT): Construal level theory asserts that people construe
events or object differently in given circumstances, sometimes abstractly and sometimes
concretely (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010).
Abstract construals are general, unobservable, or broad concepts. Abstract construals often
include inclusive categorizations of objects (e.g. dogs, mammals) due to their broad and general
nature. Concrete construals are specific, observable, or discrete concepts. Concrete construals
often emphasize tangible or specific mindsets.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Stereotypes and Stigma: A Process of Generalization
Stereotypes are an overgeneralized set of characteristics that categorize a particular group
(Judd & Park, 1993). Such generalizations may have positive connotations (e.g., people of Asian
descent are good at math) and other generalizations may have negative connotations (e.g.
professors are absentminded) (Siy & Cheryan, 2013; Myers, 2008). Regardless of whether
stereotypes have positive or negative connotations, it is important to note that they are
generalizations and lack detail. The generalizations that stereotypes provide can thus have
consequences. In fact, because stereotypes are generalizations, they may not accurately describe
every person who is a member of the prospective group (Judd & Park, 1993).
Stereotypes may help the person holding the stereotype conserve cognitive energy (Macrae,
Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Illustrating this point, participants in Macrae and colleagues’
study completed a task in which they monitored auditory stimuli while forming impressions of
people. Half of the participants received stereotype consistent descriptors of a person and the
other half received neutral descriptors of a person. Participants then recalled all of the
information that they could remember about the people previously presented. Participants
presented with stereotype consistent descriptors remembered more information about the people
than did the participants presented with the neutral traits condition. These results suggest that
unconscious generalizations provided by stereotypes are easy to acquire. By relying on
stereotypes, Macrae and colleagues argue that people can often gain information about another
person without having to allocate their cognitive resources to monitor their behavior, in turn
simplifying their environment. In sum, stereotypes enable people to quickly make sense of the
world, make decisions more efficiently, and reduce the amount of information that a person has
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to attend. Other research has confirmed this “cognitive miser” approach to stereotypes, noting
that stereotypes conserve energy (e.g. Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Sherman & Frost, 2000).
However, in most instances, the generalized nature of stereotypes can have detrimental and
harmful effects; particularly negative stereotypes. First, negative stereotypes often lead to
negative judgments of a particular group (prejudice) as well as negative behavior
(discrimination) (Fiske, 2000). One stigmatized group is people who are obese, particularly
women who are obese (Register & Williams, 1990).To give an example, people who are obese
are discriminated against more than most other social groups (Klacynski, Goold, & Mundry,
2004). In fact, 90 % of children who are obese report being teased and feeling ashamed and
humiliated (Neumark-Sztainer, Story, & Faibisch, 1998; Irving, 2000). Additionally, women
who have obesity receive less pay than women who do not have obesity (Register & Williams,
1990). The discrepancy in pay between women who have obesity and women do not have
obesity seems to stem directly from the belief that women who have obesity are less productive
than women who do not have obesity. As illustrated, the generalized nature of this particular
stereotypes may be what leads to their detrimental nature.
Second, because stereotypes are generalizations, they are often inaccurate in that they may
not account for all characteristics about a group. For example, the belief that most Americans
who are on welfare are African American is not true, although it is a common belief of many
people based on stereotypes (Myers, 2008). Unfortunately, the generalized nature of stereotypes
makes them difficult to change. Stereotypes embody characteristics that are intangible,
enduring, and resistant to confirmation. Intangible terms persist across situations, whereas
tangible or concrete terms are transient (Maas et al., 1989). In other words, labeling a person as
“crazy” or “dangerous” makes it difficult to challenge or change the assertion due to the
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intangible nature of the term. Individuals with mental illness frequently receive vague, intangible
descriptors (e.g. crazy, dangerous), which maintains the negative generalizations that society
offers (Corrigan & Watson, 2002). In contrast, descriptions of particular actions, as opposed to
generalizations, are transient and situation dependent. To illustrate, if a person with mental
illness was continually pacing around a room and someone described their behavior as
“walking,” then the description of the action ceases once the person stops walking. However, if a
person described the same individual as “crazy”, then the negative evaluation persists even when
the person ceases their walking. That is, the label “crazy” can persist while a person is at a store,
at school, or even on Mount Everest. Semantic differences in descriptions of others can
dramatically affect perception (Maas et al., 1989).
In fact, the linguistic intergroup bias identifies such patterns of behavior. According to this
theory, individuals tend to construe the behavior of the self, versus others, using distinct
linguistic patterns that reflect their own biases and maintain the status quo (Maas et al., 1989).
Maas and colleagues found that when people describe the behavior of others within their social
group, they use different linguistic patterns to describe their behavior than they do to describe the
behavior of others outside of their social group. Particularly, the perception of desirable
behaviors of others within their social group and undesirable behaviors of those outside of their
social group was abstract. Similarly, the perception of undesirable behaviors of others within
their social group and desirable behaviors of those outside of their social group was concrete.
Linguistically, adjectives are often abstract (e.g. aggressive) while verbs are concrete (e.g. John
hit Paul). When people describe positive in-group characteristics and negative out-group
characteristics they tend to use abstract language. Similarly, when people describe negative ingroup characteristics and positive out-group characteristics they tend to use concrete language.
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Information coded at a high level of abstraction is resistant to change, relatively stable over time,
and perceived as providing more information about social targets than information encoded at a
more concrete level of abstraction. (Maas et al., 1989). In other words, by holding intangible,
vague, or negative generalizations about another group of people, negative beliefs about the
group persist.
In summary, although generalizations help conserve cognitive energy, they often contribute
to negative evaluations of others. Out-group generalizations are often negative, while in-group
generalizations are often positive (Maas et al., 1989). Due to this tendency to generalize, people
may inadvertently ascribe negative attributes to those outside of their social group. Because
society judges people with mental illness as outsiders, society may make negative
generalizations about people with mental illness, a process known as stigma (Corrigan &
Watson, 2002).
Mental Illness Stigma
Goffman defined stigma as a demeaning characteristic, leading to marginalization and
judgment by society (Goffman, 1963). The term stigma originally referred to signs cut or burned
into a person’s body to represent something unusual or bad about the moral status of that person
(Goffman, 1963). Society avoided the bearers of these marks because of negative beliefs about
them (e.g., they are contaminated). Although stigma is not necessarily associated with a physical
burn or cut, stigmatized individuals still face disgrace and judgment from society.
Goffman (1963) described two types of stigmatized individuals, discreditable and
discredited. As he describes, discreditable individuals seek to hide information that reveals that
they are part of a stigmatized group. Additionally, discreditable individuals often have to manage
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the tension that arises when interacting with the general population. Discreditable individuals can
often hide that they are a part of a stigmatized group, whereas a discredited person must learn
how to deal with and manage prejudice and marginalization on a daily basis, with no sense of
escape. In sum, discreditable individuals can often hide that they are a part of a stigmatized
group, whereas discredited individuals cannot hide their stigmatizing features and must learn to
manage the stigmatization that they experience.
Depending on the extent of a person’s mental illness, people with mental illness are often
discredited and seen as less than human (Goffman, 1963). By thinking about stigmatized groups,
such as people with mental illness, as less than human, it becomes easier for people to
discriminate and make snap decisions about them without considering the negative implications
of doing so. For example, negative generalizations or labels, are utilized without considering the
original meaning of the word (Goffman, 1963). Additionally, people may interpret defensiveness
from a member of a stigmatized group as further evidence of their “defect” or moral shortcoming
(Goffman, 1963).
Mental health stigma encompasses several beliefs, many of which are generalizations.
For example, research suggests that those with mental illness are weak, violent, sinful, or
untreatable (Kobau, DiIorio, Chapman, & Delvecchio, 2010), words that incidentally would be
coded as “abstract” or general on Semin and Fiedler’s linguistic intergroup bias coding scale
(Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Other research has found that people hold other beliefs about people
with mental illness. Common beliefs found in factor analysis include: People with mental illness
are dangerous, people with mental illness are to blame for the disabilities that arise from weak
character, and people with mental illness are incompetent and require authority figures to make
decisions for them (Brockington, Hall, Levings, & Murphy, 1993; Taylor & Dear, 1980).
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Similarly, the media may also contribute to other stigmas. Popular media encourages
mental illness stigma by portraying individuals with mental illness as scary, crazy, inept, or
dangerous (Corrigan et al., 2012). A recent review of U.S. newspapers revealed that 39% of all
articles related to mental illness portrayed people with mental illness as dangerous and violent
(Corrigan, Watson, Gracia, Slopen, Rasinski, & Hall, 2005). Furthermore, media analysis of film
and print representations of mental illness has revealed the following beliefs: individuals with
mental illness are homicidal maniacs, they are rebellious free spirits, and they have childlike
perceptions of the world (Corrigan, 1998). In short, these studies suggest that negative and
stigmatizing generalizations about people with mental illness abound. In fact, beliefs about
people with mental illness often construe them as exhibiting moral shortcomings or
dangerousness.
These studies also tend to measure negative attitudes and judgments directed toward
people with mental illness. Specifically, these studies suggest that negative attitudes are
generalizations or abstract thought. In fact, if Semin and Fiedler’s linguistic intergroup coding
scale were applied to the beliefs of the studies described previously (e.g. people with mental
illness are weak, violent, sinful, dangerous, incompetent) (Kobau et al., 2010; Brockington, Hall,
Levings, & Murphy, 1993; Taylor & Dear, 1980) all would be listed as “abstract” or
dispositional rather than “concrete” or situational (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). However, these
studies concerning mental illness stigmas have not examined how certain cognitive mechanisms
may activate or dissipate such generalizations. It is important to study public attitudes toward
individuals with mental illness, including the understanding of the cognitive factors that may
activate or decrease negative generalizations.
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Construal Level Theory
Construal Level Theory (CLT) is one such theory that can provide insight about factors
that lead to and maintain stigmatizing attitudes. Additionally, it may provide insight into ways to
decrease stigma. To summarize, CLT asserts that people construe events or object differently in
given circumstances, sometimes abstractly and sometimes concretely (Liberman & Trope, 1998;
Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010). As Liberman and Trope (1998) describe,
abstract construals are general, unobservable, or broad concepts. In contrast, concrete construals
are specific, observable, or discrete concepts. For example, “having fun” is an abstract concept
while “riding a rollercoaster” is more concrete. Additionally abstract construals often include a
more inclusive categorizations of objects (e.g. dogs, mammals), and concrete construals are more
focused or tangible (e.g. cocker spaniel). Although abstract construals are often more intangible
or vague than concrete construals, they are often perceived as providing more information than
concrete construals (Semin & Fiedler, 1988, Maas et al., 1989).
In this sense, abstract construals are very similar to the generalized nature of stereotypes.
Because stereotypes are generalizations, they are often vague or intangible. Similarly, people
often perceive stereotypes as globally and accurately describing a specific group of people.
Although these descriptions are often vague, like abstract construals, people often perceive them
as providing more information than more specific descriptions of the group.
Changing Construal Level
According to Trope and Liberman (2010), people can change their level of construal. In
many instances, construal level changes due to different aspects of distance (Trope & Liberman,
2010). As distance increases people tend to think about things in increasingly abstract ways;
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whereas direct contact with a person or event lead to more concrete descriptions of that particular
person or event. Abstraction is as a way to look to the future or the past when one does not have
direct contact with a specific person or event (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Similarly, as people
become more familiar with a particular stimulus and distance decreases, people tend to think
about events in a more concrete manner. In fact, changes in distance lead to changes in construal
level. First, level of construal changes when temporal distance changes. People tend to view
future events as abstract and present events as concrete (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Stephan,
Liberman, & Trope, 2011). For example, if people are planning to take a vacation one year from
now, they will likely think of their vacation in abstract ways, such as going on vacation or
getting out of town. However, if people were going on vacation in the next two weeks, they
would describe their trip concretely, such as going to a specific beach, staying at a specific hotel,
and having a specific itinerary (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Again, future events are abstract and
current or near events are concrete.
Second, level of construal changes as spatial distance changes (Trope & Liberman,
2010). People tend to view spatially distant objects as abstract and spatially near objects as
concrete (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006). Fujita and colleagues (2006)
found that participants who imagined helping a friend move to a faraway location described their
behavior as more abstract than participants who imagined that they were helping their friend
move to a spatially closer location (e.g. putting clothes in a washing machine vs. removing odors
from clothing). The tendency to view spatially distant objects as more abstract than spatially near
objects occurs due to people’s tendency to rely on schematic information or stereotypes when
they are removed from direct experience (Fujita et al., 2006).
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Finally, construal level changes as social distance (perceived similarity with another
person or group) change. For example, participants tend to describe familiar people more
concretely than unfamiliar people (Idson & Mischel, 2001). Additionally, people describe
strangers with more abstract traits (e.g. sensitive) than people who are familiar (Idson & Mischel,
2001). Likewise, a stranger’s behavior is described in terms of traits (e.g. “He stepped on my toe
because he is clumsy”) whereas a familiar person’s behavior may be described in more
situational, concrete terms, (e.g. “He stepped on my toe because it is crowded”) (Gilbert, 1998).
Level of construal not only changes with distance, it also changes with primes. For
example, Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope (2004) demonstrated that a person could be primed to
think more abstractly by having them describe why they would engage in an activity, and that a
person could be primed to think more concretely by having them describe how they would
engage in an activity. According to Freitas and colleagues, abstract, why construals represent the
action’s purpose and are important when thinking about a specific action while concrete, how
construals represent the process of a particular action and are of secondary concern when
thinking about a specific action. In this task, people who are primed to think abstractly are asked
why they would pursue a particular goal and are then gradually asked relatively higher order
goals by a series of why questions and answers, in essence thinking more and more abstractly
(e.g. Why write a dissertation? Complete course requirements; Why? To get a doctoral degree
etc.). People are primed to think concretely are asked how they would pursue a particular goal
and then gradually asked relatively lower order activities by a series of how questions and
answers (e.g. How would you attain life happiness? Have a good job; How would you go about
that? Get a college degree etc.).
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Similarly, having people provide examples of objects (e.g. An example of a bird is
_____) or categories of objects (e.g. A bird is an example of _____) can manipulate level of
construal (McCrea, Liberman, Trope, & Sherman, 2008). Specifically, identifying examples of
objects primes a concrete mindset, while identifying categories of objects primes an abstract
mindset.
Additionally, there are more subtle ways to manipulate construal level. For example,
Liberman and Förster (2009) primed abstract mindset by having participants ignore small letters
and respond to large letters as quickly as possible and primed concrete mindsets by having
participants ignore large letters and respond to small letters as quickly as possible on a reaction
time task. When participants focused on global features, they paid more attention to the
distinguishing features of an object and less on specific details, thereby enacting a more abstract
focus. Similarly, when participants focused on more local features, they paid more attention to
the distinguishing features of an object, thereby enacting a more concrete focus. By focusing on
large details, more global/abstract features were attended, thus priming an abstract construal
mindset, while focusing on more local/concrete features, primed a concrete construal mindset.
Although abstract and concrete construals can be primed, personality, or the tendency to
think abstractly vs. concretely, has also served as a predictor variable (Vallacher & Wegner,
1989). Vallacher and Wegner (1989) assessed people’s tendency to view their actions in abstract
versus concrete ways. In doing so, they created the Behavior Identification Form (BIF), which is
a measure that assesses individual differences in describing action. On the BIF, participants
viewed action verbs and endorsed a response (one response being abstract and the other
concrete). For example, participants viewed the word "voting" and endorsed either “influencing
the election or marking a ballot.” The measure was shown to have high internal consistency (α =
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.83). Results indicate that people who tend to view action in abstract terms tend to think about
actions in terms of motives and larger meanings of the action (e.g. focus on why they engage in
an action), whereas people who tend to view action in concrete terms think about actions in
terms of the detail (e.g. focus on how they engage in an action). Research has used this scale as a
predictor variable in several studies (e.g. Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012, Freitas et al., 2002, &
Bishop, Thomas, & Peper, 2000).
Abstract or concrete construals influence how people think, make decisions, and
generalize (McCrea, Wieber, & Myers, 2012). For example, Förster (2009) examined the role of
processing style (global vs. local) on focus of similarity. Förster hypothesized that global
processing (e.g. looking at the whole picture) would induce a focus on similarities on unrelated
tasks, whereas local processing (e.g. looking at parts of a stimulus) would induce a focus on
differences on unrelated tasks. Participants were primed to think either globally (abstractly) or
locally (concretely), utilizing various tasks (responding to small letters vs. large letters, assessing
whole map vs. one location) and then asked to assess similarities or differences on unrelated
tasks (TV shows, objects, statues, pictures of people). Additionally, the study viewed the effect
of temporal distance and power on a focus on similarity or differences. In the temporal distance
study, participants either thought about a trip to New Zealand one year from now, today, or
simply thought about it, depending on condition. They then compared two television shows. In
the power study, participants were primed with either high power words (e.g. authority, captain,
privileged) or low power words (passive, servant, janitor) and then asked to compare two
television shows. Förster found that participants primed to think globally (abstractly) found more
similarities than those primed to think locally (concretely). Similarly, participants who were
primed to think locally (concretely) found more differences than those primed to think globally
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(abstractly). Finally, greater temporal distance and high power induced a search for similarities
while temporal closeness and low power induced a search for differences. These studies suggest
that subtle cues can affect how information is processed. Because abstract construals (global
processing) may promote an emphasis on similarities and promote inclusive categorizations, it is
reasonable that abstract construals may relate to generalizations or stigma.
In sum, priming a person to think abstractly or concretely directly influences their
cognition. Given that construal level has direct implications for decision-making and social
cognition, priming may be an ideal way to help people think more abstractly or concretely. In
fact, priming a person to think abstractly or concretely has direct implications for stigma
reduction.
Construal Level and Stigma
Some evidence suggests that activation of abstract versus concrete construals relates to
how people view and behave toward stigmatized others. For example, Levy, Freitas, and
Salovey (2002) examined the extent that construal level predicted attitudes and behaviors toward
stigmatized groups, such as people who are homeless and people living with AIDS. These
researchers hypothesized that abstract construals would increase a similarity focus toward others,
thereby leading to less stigmatizing attitudes and a greater willingness to help others because
abstract construals tend to put people in touch with mutually shared goals. To test this
hypothesis, participants, across all studies, completed the Behavior Identification Form (BIF), a
form that measured the extent that they thought abstract versus concretely. In Studies 1-3,
participants completed different measures of perceived similarity with stigmatized group
members like people with AIDS and people who are homeless, members of their own social
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group, as well as measures of one’s ability to view the world from another person’s perspective
and empathy.
Specifically, in Study 1, the more abstractly participants tended to think, the more similar
they perceived themselves to be with other groups. In Study 2, the more abstractly participants
tended to think, the more similar they felt people were to one another, and the more easily they
took the perspective of another person. In Study 3, the more abstractly participants tended to
think, the more similar they perceived stigmatized group members (e.g. person with aids or
homeless person) to be to one another and the more empathy they felt toward stigmatized group
members. Together, Studies 1-3 provide evidence that people who tend to think abstractly view
themselves as being more similar to other people, more easily take the perspective of others, and
feel greater empathy toward others compared to people who tend to think concretely.
Additionally, the ability to see things from another’s perspective was predictive of increased
empathy toward others when they tended to think abstractly.
Levy and colleagues expanded their research in Studies 4-6 by assessing if people who
tend to think more abstractly are more likely to help other people. In Study 4, the more abstractly
participants tended to think, the more likely they were to feel empathy for others and the more
likely they were to help another person. In Study 5, the more abstractly participants tended to
think, the more likely they were to volunteer to help people from different groups (e.g. homeless
persons, senior citizens, and sick children), participate in volunteer activities, and exhibit more
empathy towards others. Finally, in Study 6, the more abstractly participants tended to think, the
more likely they were to donate money to a charitable organization. Overall, these series of
studies illustrates that people who tend to think abstractly not only feel greater empathy toward
others, but are more likely to engage in specific helping behaviors compared to people who tend
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to think concretely. These studies relate to stigma in that empathy and perceived similarity are
both vital to theoretical conceptualizations of stigma (Corrigan et al., 2004). In fact, empathy
relates to other measures of stigma (Brown, 2008). Similarly, these series of studies assess
behavioral measures of stigma (e.g. donation task, willingness to volunteer), which are predictive
of stigmatizing attitudes (Fritsche & Linneweber, 2006).
Levy and colleagues (2002) argue that these effects arise because people of all
backgrounds pursue similar abstract goals. Thus, individuals who typically think of action in
abstract terms are better able to perceive similarity with other people, as well as identify similar
goals (Levy et al., 2002). For example, a physician may review their daily actions rather
concretely (e.g. prescribing medications or diagnosing disorders) or more abstractly (e.g.
providing for their family). If a person with a mental illness came to their office and the
physician tended to think concretely then they would probably perceive little similarity between
themselves, a doctor, and their patient (a person with mental illness). However, if the physician
tended to think abstractly, they may perceive greater similarity between their goals (providing for
their family) and the patient’s goals (seeking treatment to better provide for their family).
Because abstract goals transcend across people and social categorization, people are likely to
relate to another’s goal, therefore making it easier to take another person’s perspective and feel
highly similar to them. Confirming Levy et al.’s idea, the more people realize they share similar
goals with others, the more similar they feel to others. This, in turn, leads to less conflict with
others (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).
Though Levy and colleagues (2002) provided evidence that abstract thinking predicts
empathy toward stigmatized groups, they did not provide evidence that abstract thinking causes
empathy toward stigmatized groups. Instead, Levy and colleagues evaluated differences in
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participants who tended to evaluate action in abstract versus concrete terms, rather than directly
manipulating level of construal via an unrelated task or prime. This distinction is important
because people who chronically view action in either concrete or abstract terms may have
different personality variables that could affect their outlook or judgments independently of
psychological distance (Watkins, 2011). Priming an individual to think abstractly vs. concretely
via an unrelated task may produce different results than simply relying on a self-report
personality measure. Second, manipulation and random assignment are important when assessing
the cause-effects between any variables (Stangor, 2011) including that of construal level and
stigma. By manipulating construal level and randomly assigning participants into either be
primed to think abstractly or concretely, the effects of the effects of construal level can be
measured independent of personality characteristics.
In sum, personality variables may not generalize to an experimental manipulation of
construal level. It is important to assess how priming affects construal level and stigmatizing
attitudes. Although Levy et al.’s research suggests that thinking abstractly leads to less
stigmatizing attitudes; other experimental research suggests that abstract primes may increase
stereotypes or stigmatizing attitudes.
Although abstract construals may reduce negative attitudes because they predict less
prejudice, they may increase the activation and use of stereotypes, particularly when specific
stigmatized categories (i.e. gender, race) are prominent (McCrea et al., 2012). McCrea and
colleagues (2012) examined the influence of construal level on the activation of stereotypes.
They hypothesized that participants who were primed to think abstractly would endorse more
stereotypes than people who were primed to think concretely, perhaps because abstract
construals increase a person’s tendency to view groups as highly similar to one another.
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Specifically, in their Study 1, participants who received the abstract prime were more likely to
judge job applicants based on gender stereotypes than participants who received concrete primes
(e.g. evaluated the men as more qualified than the women). In Study 2, participants who received
the abstract prime made more stereotypical evaluations of the lawyer (e.g. evaluated the lawyer
as more aggressive and argumentative) than the priest. In Study 3, women who received the
abstract prime rated themselves as more feminine and less masculine than did the men; although
no effect was observed among men. In Study 4, women who received the abstract prime
performed worse on a math test than did men, maintaining a longstanding stereotype that women
are worse at math than men. In Study 5, participants who received the abstract prime and who
wrote down their gender (5a) or age (5b) responded faster to gender stereotypical words or age
stereotypical words than did participants who received the concrete prime or who did not write
down their age or gender. Overall, McCrea and colleagues found that participants who were
primed to think abstractly were more likely than participants who were primed to think
concretely to make stereotypic judgments of a job applicant, apply occupational stereotypes,
report greater identification with their specific in-group, assign more stereotypic traits to
themselves, perform in more stereotypic ways, and endorse more stereotypic traits. McCrea and
colleagues explain these results by suggesting that abstract construal do not directly prime
stereotypes but may increase people’s focus on the group generalization, leading to the use
stereotypical social categorizations. In other words, by priming people to think abstractly, they
are more likely to categorize people based on social cues than when primed to think concretely.
However, when no categorization cues are present, stereotype activation may not occur.
In sum, some research suggests that abstract construals are related to reduced stigma
(Levy et al., 2002). As Levy and colleagues (2002) found, people who tend to think abstractly
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show greater empathy and a greater willingness to help stigmatized individuals than people who
tend to think concretely (Levy et al., 2002). However, other research suggests that abstract
construals increase stigma. McCrea and colleagues (2012) found that people, who are primed to
think abstractly, endorse more stereotypical judgments than people who are primed to think
concretely. Thus, it is unclear the extent that construal level contributes to stigma. This
contradiction in the literature is vital to understanding how different approaches in thought can
increase or decrease stigmatizing attitudes and behavior. In examining the literature, it appears
that perceived similarity with another person or group may be an important factor in evaluating
whether people will stigmatize or stereotype others.
Statement of Problem and Hypothesis
Research by Levy and colleagues (2002) has shown that people who tend to view action
abstractly perceive greater similarity between themselves and members of stigmatized groups,
endorse more empathy toward disadvantaged groups, and are more willing to help than
individuals who tend to view action concretely. Levy and colleagues explained that as people
think abstractly, they more easily identify shared goals, leading to a greater focus on the
inclusion and similarity of others. Similarly, as people begin to feel highly similar to others, it
becomes easier to take another’s perspective, which leads to greater empathy and compassion
toward others. Finally, when people feel compassion and empathy toward others, they are more
likely to help others.
In the context of mental illness, people who tend to think abstractly should be able to
overlook stigmatizing features of the person with mental illness and simply see them as a person.
Because abstract construals foster a focus on similarity (Levy et al., 2002), people who think
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abstractly should overlook their differences leading to less stigmatizing attitudes and behavior.
However, research has failed to test this hypothesis utilizing experimental manipulation.
In the present study, participants were primed to think abstractly or concretely, and then
evaluated a person with a mental illness. Based on research suggesting abstract construals predict
less stigmatizing attitudes and behavior by increasing a similarity focus toward others (Levy et
al., 2002), it was predicted that participants who were primed to think abstractly would endorse
less stigmatizing beliefs and be more willing to help individuals with mental illness than
individuals who were primed to think concretely.
Hypothesis 1a: Participants primed to think abstractly will stigmatize a person with
mental illness less than a person primed to think concretely, because abstract primes will
increase the activation of similar goals, leading to a similarity focus. The perception of similarity
with a person with mental illness will explain the relationship between construal level and
stigmatizing attitudes and behavior.
On the contrary, there is also evidence that when people are primed to think abstractly,
they may be more likely to rely on stereotypes, particularly when categorization cues are present
(e.g. gender, race) (McCrae et al., 2012). In the context of mental illness, people who are primed
to think abstractly may focus on categorization cues leading to more stereotypical attitudes and
behavior toward people with mental illness than people who are primed to think concretely.
Because most stereotypes of people with mental illness are negative generalizations, the term
“mental illness” should serve as a cue for negative social categorization when people are primed
to think abstractly (Corrigan et al., 2012; Corrigan, 1998).
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Hypothesis 1b: Participants primed to think abstractly will stigmatize a person with
mental illness more than a person primed to think concretely because abstract primes will
increase a focus on within group similarities leading to more stereotype consistent
categorizations. Because stereotypes of people with mental illness are largely negative, abstract
primes will lead to stigmatizing attitudes and behavior by decreasing a similarity focus between
the participants and the person with mental illness.
In sum, no research has assessed the effects construal level on mental illness stigma. In
the present study, I aimed to fill these gaps by examining how construal level affects mental
illness stigma. Specifically, I manipulated level of construal and measured both stigmatizing
attitudes and stigmatizing behavior toward people with mental illness. Additionally, a measure of
perceived similarity with people with mental illness was administered, as perceived similarity
was though to explain the relationship between construal level and stigmatizing attitudes and
behavior.
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Chapter 3: Method
Participants
Participants included 87 male (42%) and 121 female (58%) college students, recruited
from a regional southern university, consisting of 79 African Americans (38%), 106 Caucasians
(51%), 6 Hispanics (2.9 %), and 4 Asians (1.9%). Nine students identified as Multiracial (4.3 %)
and 4 students did not identify with any of the listed categories (4.9%). The mean age of the
sample was 19.93 (SD = 3.90). The number of participants needed was based on a power
analysis utilizing two consecutive regression models (model 1: construal level, perceived
similarity, and stigmatizing attitudes; model 2: construal level, perceived similarity, and
stigmatizing behavior) (Cohen, 1992). The characteristics of the sample are listed in Table 1.
Participants were recruited through the Psychology Department Research Pool. They
completed the study as a requirement for an undergraduate class or in exchange for extra credit.
Participants were treated in accordance with the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct” (American Psychological Association, 2002). Informed consent was obtained from all
subjects.
Design & Materials
For this study, a between participants experimental design with random assignment was
utilized. Additionally, mediation modeling was utilized to examine the mechanism of how
construal level impacts stigmatizing attitudes and behavior. Construal level (Abstract, Concrete,
Control) was the predictor variable and stigmatizing attitudes and behavior were the outcome
variables. Perceived similarity with a person with mental illness was utilized to explain the
relationship between construal level and stigmatizing attitudes and behavior. To manipulate
construal level, participants were primed to think abstractly or concretely using a manipulation
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adapted from Freitas et al. (2004). This manipulation is widely used in the literature and was
used in McCrea et al.’s (2012) study, which was one of the key studies in developing our
hypotheses and method. Effect sizes for this manipulation range from Cohen’s d .40 to 1.47 in
previous research (Freitas et al., 2004).
Stigma Measures
Attribution Questionnaire (AQ-27). The Attribution Questionnaire is a measure of
mental illness stigma, which utilizes a short, neutral vignette about a fictional character named
“Harry.” Corrigan et al. (1999) showed that asking participants to respond to a specific person
with mental illness is a more sensitive measure of attitudes than a general measure of mental
illness stigma. The AQ-27 is comprised of 27 items in which participants respond to “Harry”
utilizing a 9 point Likert type scale (e.g. “Harry would terrify me”; 9 = very much). The scale is
comprised of nine factor scores, which include responsibility, pity, anger, dangerousness, fear,
avoidance, coercion, segregation, and help. Brown (2008) identified six factors, which include
fear/dangerousness (α = .93), help/interact (α = .82), responsibility (α = .60), forcing treatment
(.79), empathy (α = .77), and negative emotions (.81). Additionally, Brown (2008) found that 20
of the 27 items had acceptable reliability and validity, comprising four scales
(fear/dangerousness, help/interact, forcing treatment, & negative emotions). These four scales are
positively correlated with other measures of stigma (e.g. Social Distance Scale, Dangerousness
Scale, Affect Scale). For this study, the Cronbach’s alphas for each of the nine factors are as
follows: Blame = .56, Anger = .86, Pity = .73, Help = .79, Dangerousness = .90, Fear = .92,
Segregation = .86, Coercion = .54, and Avoidance = .78. Due to their low internal consistency,
the Blame and Coercion factors were no included in the analyses.
Resource Allocation (Behavioral Measure of Stigma). Behavioral measures are important
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because self-report measures are often biased due to social desirability and demand
characteristics of the researcher (Fritsche & Linneweber, 2006). Behavioral measures tend to
mirror a person’s actual views and are less sensitive to bias than self-report measures. In this
study, a behavioral measure was collected by telling participants they would have a chance of
winning a drawing, and they were subsequently asked how much of the money they would like
to donate to the charity if they indeed, did win the money. Participants viewed four options: (1)
$25 to me and $0 to the charity (b) $15 to me and $10 to the charity (c) $10 to me and $15 to the
charity, or (d) $0 to me and $25 to the charity. The winning participant had their prescribed share
of the money donated to NAMI following the completion of the study. The National Alliance on
Mental Illness (NAMI), an organization that advocates for individuals with mental illness and
their families, was the charity used in this study. Participants drew a number after completing the
study. This measure was based on Corrigan’s measure of resource allocation (Corrigan, Watson,
Warpinski, & Gracia, 2004).
Mediator
Inclusion of Others in the Self Scale (IOS). The IOS is a single item, pictorial measure of
closeness, usually utilized in close relationship research. Although it has been well validated in
close relationship literature (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), it has never been utilized in mental
illness stigma research. It has been shown to have high internal consistency (α = .93) and has
been shown to correlate well with other measures of intimacy (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992;
Woosnam, 2010). Rather than asking participants to rate how close they feel to someone with
mental illness, this measure assessed how similar the participants felt to someone with a mental
illness utilizing a Venn diagram (see appendices A and B). Additionally, another version was
utilized to assess how similar participants perceived “Harry” to be with other individuals with
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schizophrenia.
Manipulation Check
Behavior Identification Form (BIF). The BIF is a 25-item, dichotomous-response
questionnaire, which assesses people’s tendency to view action as either abstract or concrete. As
previously described, each item describes a particular action (e.g., “voting”) and participants
either endorse an abstract response (e.g. “influencing the election”) or concrete response
(“marking a ballot”). The measure has been shown to have high internal consistency (α = .83).
The BIF was utilized as a manipulation check to assess whether participants were actually
primed to think either concretely or abstractly, as it has been used in previous research (Belding,
Naufel, & Fujita, 2015). The order of BIF administration was counterbalanced, with half of the
participants receiving it after the construal level task and half of the participants taking it after
the administration of the dependent variables (Perdue & Summers, 1986).
Procedure
Participants were run, two at a time, in a laboratory setting. All measures were
administered on a computer using Qualtrics.

Participants were told that they would be

completing a series of studies. To decrease demand characteristics, they were not told that the
questionnaires were related to one another. Participants were then randomly assigned to a
construal level condition (abstract, concrete, control), utilizing Freitas and colleagues (2004)
manipulation. In the control condition, participants simply proceeded to the second part of the
study and received no construal level manipulation. After the construal level manipulation was
completed a manipulation check was utilized to assess participants’ construal level. The
Behavior identification Form (BIF) was utilized as a manipulation check and was
counterbalanced with half of the participants completing the BIF directly after the construal level
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task and the other half of the participants completing the BIF after the dependent measures were
administered. Next, participants completed the Attribution Questionnaire (AQ-27). Finally,
participants completed the resource allocation task outlined above.
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Chapter 4: Results
Inclusion Criteria for Study and Analyses
Inclusion criteria for the study included being age 18 or older. Inclusion criteria for the
analyses included completing all of the measures. Initially, there were 211 participants in the
study. However, three of the participants did not complete all of the measures. Therefore they
were not included in the analyses.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for all measures utilized were analyzed for normality. The mean
scores, standard deviations, ranges, and standard errors for all participants on the AQ-27
subscales are included in Table 2. The mean score for participants on the resource allocation task
(behavioral measure of stigma) was 2.78 (SD = 1.16; SEM = .08). The range for the scale was 3
with a minimum of 1 and maximum of 4. The mean score for the measure of perceived similarity
with an individual with mental illness was 2.62 (SD = 1.64; SEM = .11). The range for the scale
was 6 with a minimum 1 and a maximum of 7. The mean score for the measure of within group
similarity between the target (“Harry”) and people with schizophrenia was 4.82 (SD = 1.56; SEM
= .11). The range for the scale was 6 with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 7. Finally, the
mean score of participants on the behavior identification form (BIF) was 15.59 (SD = 5.38; SEM
= .37). The range for the scale was 24 with a minimum 1 and a maximum of 25. The data were
not significantly skewed.
To examine the relationship between perceived similarity and mental illness stigma, a
series of correlations were conducted. Previous research suggests as people perceive greater
similarity with a person of a stigmatized group they exhibit less stigma toward the stigmatized
group (Levy et al., 2002). A significant positive correlation was found between perceived
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similarity with a person with mental illness and willingness to assist persons with mental illness,
r (206) = .23, p < .001. Similarly, there was a significant negative correlation found between
perceived similarity with a person with mental illness and the following AQ-27 subscales: anger,
r (206) = -.15, p =.04, dangerousness, r (206) = -.15, p = .03, fear, r (206) = -.17, p = .01,
segregation, r (206) = -.21, p = .002, coercion, r (206)= -.29, p = <.001, and avoidance, r (206) =
-.30, p = <.001. Overall, as perceived similarity with a person with mental illness decreases,
participants tended to view people with mental illness as more angry and dangerous. Similarly,
as perceived similarity with a person with mental illness decreases, participants endorsed higher
levels of fear toward people with mental illness and were more likely to endorse greater
avoidance and attitudes favoring the segregation of people with mental illness from the rest of
society. In summary, these findings suggest that as perceived similarity with a person with
mental illness decreases, negative attitudes toward individuals with mental illness increase,
confirming previous research (Levy et al., 2002). A correlation matrix summarizing these results
is found in Table 3.
Manipulation Check
There were no order effects found, F(1, 206) = .35, p = .56, ηp2 = .00, ns. In order to
assess the effectiveness of the construal level task, an ANOVA was conducted to assess the main
effect of the randomly assigned construal level condition on the participants’ BIF scores. The
ANOVA revealed no significant differences between construal level on participants’ BIF scores,
F (2, 205) = .77, p = .47, ηp2 = .01, ns, possibly indicating that the manipulation was not
successful. Due to the failed manipulation check, a coding scheme was developed to assess
whether participants correctly completed the construal level manipulation. Two coders
independently evaluated each survey and completed the coding sheet. The kappa score of the two
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independent raters was .73. Discrepancies between raters were decided by a third reviewer.
Participants who failed the manipulation, based on the raters’ evaluations of the surveys, were
removed from the survey. After removing the participants who failed to complete the construal
level task appropriately from the analysis (n = 23), the ANOVA was repeated and there
continued to be no significant differences between construal level on participants’ BIF scores, F
(2,182) = .58, p = .56, ηp2 = .01, ns. The BIF is a measure of a person’s action identification (e.g.
tendency of a person to construe action in abstract versus concrete terms) and has been well
validated in previous literature (Levy et al., 2002; Luguri et al., 2012; Maas et al., 1989;
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Because of the failed manipulation, analyses assessing the main
effects of construal level on stigma were performed twice: Once with the manipulation as the
independent variable, and once with the BIF as the predictor variable.
The Effects of Construal Level on Mental Illness Stigma
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to assess the effects of
construal level on stigmatizing attitudes (as assessed the AQ-27 subscales) toward individuals
with mental illness. As previously reported, the Blame and Coercion scales were not included in
the MANOVA due to their low internal consistency. There was a significant effect of construal
level on stigmatizing attitudes toward an individual with mental illness, F (14, 398) = 1.81, p =
0.04, ηp2 = .06. However, the tests of between-subjects effects revealed the pity scale to be the
only significant condition, F (2, 205) = 3.93, p =.02, ηp2 = .04. Those who were in the control
condition pitied Harry more (M = 21.41; SD = 4.73) than those in the abstract (M = 19.32; SD =
4.86) or concrete conditions (M = 19.74; SD = 4.73). Thus, no meaningful differences were
observed between construal level and stigmatizing attitudes towards an individual with mental
illness.
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An ANOVA was then utilized to assess the main effects of construal level on
stigmatizing behavior (resource allocation task) toward individuals with mental illness. An
ANOVA also revealed non-significant differences between construal level on the resource
allocation task (behavioral measure), F (2, 205) = .69, p = .50, ηp2 = .01, ns. A chi square
analysis also revealed no significant relationship between construal level and the resource
allocation task, X2(6, N = 208) = 4.97, p =.55, ns.
Two ANOVAs were then utilized to assess the main effects of construal level on a)
perceived similarity with an individual with mental illness and b) perceived similarity between
“Harry” and other people with Schizophrenia. The first ANOVA revealed no significant
differences between construal level on perceived similarity with an individual with mental
illness, F (2, 206) = .98, p = .38, ηp2 = .01, ns. The second ANOVA also revealed no significant
differences between construal level on perceived similarity between “Harry” and other people
with schizophrenia, F (2, 204) = 1.10, p = .34, ηp2 = .01, ns. No significant main effects were
noted on any of the stigma measures, even after removing participants who did not complete the
construal level manipulation appropriately.
The Correlation of Construal Level with Mental Illness Stigma
In order to assess the relationship between a person’s tendency to construe action in
abstract versus concrete terms and mental illness stigma, bivariate correlations were conducted to
assess the relationship between the participants’ BIF scores, AQ-27 scores, and the resource
allocation task. No significant correlations were found between BIF scores, AQ-27 scores, and
the resource allocation task, with one exception. There was a significant positive correlation
found between BIF scores and AQ-27 help scale, r (206) = .22, p = .001. This finding suggests a
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higher level of construal (e.g. increased abstract thinking) is associated with a greater willingness
to help people with mental illness. A correlation matrix summarizing these results is presented in
Table 6.
Mediation Analyses
To test hypotheses 1a, Preacher and Hayes’ (2004) mediation analysis was utilized to
assess whether perceived similarity with a person with mental illness mediates the relationship
between construal level and stigmatizing attitudes (as measured by the AQ-27 subscales) and
behaviors toward individuals with mental illness (as measured by the resource allocation task).
Bias corrected boot strapping procedures were used (N = 1000) to generate 95% confidence
intervals (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). Construal level conditions were dummy coded for the
analyses (e.g. Abstract – 1; Concrete – 2; and Control – 3). This analysis yields many benefits
compared to other types of mediation analysis (e.g. Baron and Kenny, 1986). For example,
Preacher and Hayes’ analysis reduces the possibility of both a Type I and Type II error by
looking at indirect effects (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). Additionally, unlike other mediation
analyses, neither the predictor and mediator nor the mediator and outcome variables are required
to be related to one another to run the analysis. Unfortunately, these analyses revealed no
significant indirect effects (see table 4 for results). To test hypotheses 1b, Preacher and Hayes’
(2004) mediation analysis was utilized to assess whether perceived within group similarity
between the target (“Harry”) and other people with schizophrenia mediates the relationship
between construal level and stigmatizing attitudes (as measured by the AQ-27 subscales) and
behaviors toward individuals with mental illness (as measured by the resource allocation task).
Bias corrected boot strapping procedures were again used (N = 1000) to generate 95%
confidence intervals (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). These analyses revealed non-significant
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indirect effects (see Table 5 for results). In lieu of these failed analyses, both mediation models
(Hypotheses 1A and 1B) were repeated using the BIF as the predictor variable. Both of these
analyses again revealed non-significant indirect effects.
Rural vs. Urban effects
Two MANOVAs were conducted with rurality classification on AQ-27 subscales. The
Blame and Coercion subscales were not included in the analyses due to their low internal
consistency. There were no significant rural differences found between people from rural versus
urban areas, F(7,198) = 1. 03, p = .41, ηp2 = .04, ns, or people currently living in rural versus
urban areas on stigmatizing attitudes toward an individual with mental illness, F(7, 198) = .71, p
= .66, ηp2 = .03, ns. Two ANOVAs were subsequently conducted with rurality classification and
the resource allocation task. There were no significant rural differences found between people
from rural versus urban areas, F (1,206) = .67, p = .41, ηp2 = .00, ns, or people currently living in
rural versus urban areas, F (1, 206) = 1.26, p = .26, ηp2 = .01, ns, on the resource allocation task.
Chi square analyses also revealed non-significant relationship between the resource allocation
task and rural differences between people from rural versus urban areas, X2(3, N = 208) = 6.48, p
=.09, ns, or people currently living in rural versus urban areas, X2(3, N = 208) = 3.44, p =.33, ns.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effects of construal level on
stigmatizing attitudes and behavior toward people with mental illness. Furthermore, this study
sought to clarify the role of construal level on mental illness stigma. A discrepancy exists in the
literature, with some research citing that construal level increases stigma (McCrae et al., 2012)
and other research citing that construal level decreases stigma (Levy et al., 2002). Due to these
discrepancies, competing hypotheses emerged. First, it was hypothesized that participants primed
to think abstractly would stigmatize a person with mental illness less than participants primed to
think concretely, due to their focus on similarities between themselves and the stigmatized group
member. Alternatively, it was hypothesized that participants primed to think abstractly would
stigmatize a person with mental illness more than participants primed to think concretely, due to
their reliance on mental illness stereotypes.
Manipulation Check
In order to assess the effectiveness of the construal level task, an ANOVA was conducted
to assess the effect of the randomly assigned construal level condition on the participants’ BIF
scores. There was no effect of construal level on participants’ BIF scores, indicating that the
manipulation may not have been successful. This finding is interesting because one recent study
found that the how/why manipulation alters scores on the BIF in the predicted direction
(Belding, Naufel, & Fujita, 2015); yet this did not replicate in the current study. This null result
cannot be attributed to a floor or ceiling effect in the measure because the overall sample BIF
mean was 15 (SD = 5.38), which falls in the middle of the scale. Therefore, it is important to
explore the possible reasons that this manipulation failed.
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One reason the manipulation may have failed in the current study is that participants may
not have adequately attended to the experimental manipulation. Indeed, 32% percent of this
study’s data was collected in the final two months of the spring semester and participants may
have rushed through the survey in order to complete their course assignments. Confirming this
assumption, 23 participants (11% of the sample) did not complete the manipulation correctly.
However, no attentional measures were utilized to ensure adequate effort. Given the lack of
attentional measures, it is not possible to definitively verify this hypothesis. Further research
could use one of the other manipulations, such as having participants provide examples of
categories (abstract prime) or objects (concrete prime), to determine if the construal level task is
related to participant’s BIF scores. Additionally, future research should utilize attentional
measures to assess appropriate effort while completing the measures.
Action Identification and Mental Illness Stigma
Due to the unsuccessful construal level manipulation (see manipulation check above),
BIF scores were utilized to examine the relationship between a person’s tendency to view action
in abstract vs. concrete terms and mental illness stigma. Thus, a series of bivariate correlations
were conducted to assess the relationship between BIF scores (a person’s tendency to view
action in abstract vs. concrete terms), AQ-27 scores (attitude measure of stigma), and the
resource allocation task (behavioral measure of stigma). Overall, participants’ BIF scores were
not correlated with measures of mental illness stigma with one exception: Participants who
construed action in more abstract terms tended to endorse a greater willingness to help people
with mental illness than did participants who construed action in more concrete terms. This
finding is consistent with previous research that suggests that people who tend to construe action
in abstract terms display less stigmatizing attitudes than people who tend to construe action in
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concrete terms (Levy et al., 2002). However, based on Levy and colleagues findings, BIF scores
should have also been correlated with other measures of stigma, which was not found.
The Effects of Construal Level on Mental Illness Stigma
Against hypotheses, there were no significant effects of construal level on AQ-27 scores
or the resource allocation task. The hypotheses may not have been supported because stigma
measure were not appropriate for the sample. The Attribution Questionnaire (AQ-27) was
utilized based on its high construct validity (Corrigan et al., 1993; Corrigan, 1999; Corrigan et
al., 2004), and has been previously utilized with college student populations (Corrigan et al.,
2003; Corrigan et al., 2004). However, it should be noted that Corrigan utilized community
college populations, recruited from the general student body, because they tend to be more
demographically diverse than university students (Corrigan et al., 1999; Corrigan et al., 2002). In
contrast, this study utilized university students, recruited from introductory psychology classes.
Such differences in the population could have yielded differences on the measures.
This study’s sample was comprised entirely of undergraduate students recruited from
Introduction to Psychology classes. These classes typically include lectures and reading materials
regarding prejudice, conformity, and stigmatization (APA, 2014). This is in contrast to
Corrigan’s study, which recruited from the general student body. The fact that this study’s
participants were currently taking introductory psychology classes may have sensitized them to
issues of stigma and mental illness. Previous research has shown education and contact with a
person from a stigmatized group are the most effective ways of reducing stigma (Corrigan et al.,
2007). Therefore, it is possible that this study’s sample was less likely to display stigmatizing
attitudes toward persons with mental illness than participants recruited from the general body of
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a community college, thus decreasing the AQ-27’s generalizability. Confirming this hypothesis,
the present study’s population was less likely to avoid and more willing to help people with
mental illness than the community college comparison sample (Corrigan et al., 2004). Mean
scores for community college students on the AQ-27 subscales include: Blame – 8.2 (SD = 4.4),
Pity – 18.8 (SD = 5.6), Anger – 8.3 (SD = 4.1), Danger – 12.0 (SD = 5.2), Fear – 10.2 (SD = 5.6),
Help – 9.7 (SD = 5.7), Coercion – 17.1 (SD = 4.1), Segregation – 9.8 (SD = 5.3), and Avoidance
– 14.5 (SD = 6.5).
Another possible reason for the lack of significant findings in this study could be related
to the chosen behavioral measure. Behavioral measures are important because they tend to mirror
a person’s actual views and are less sensitive to bias than self-report measures (Fritsche &
Linneweber, 2006). Therefore, a behavioral measure was developed for this study based upon
Corrigan’s measure of resource allocation (Corrigan, Watson, Warpinski, & Gracia, 2004).
However, it is important to acknowledge that in Corrigan’s research, participants were given
money and then provided the option of either keeping the money or donating it to a mental health
organization. The present study utilized a random drawing and asked participants how they
would like the money distributed if they won the random drawing. Because the participants were
not actually given money prior to their decision to allocate, it is possible that the money was not
perceived as psychological reality. In fact, the participant who won the drawing asked the
experimenter “Do I have to donate the money like I said that I would?” If participants did not
perceive the money as psychological reality then it may have translated into an unreliable
behavioral measure of stigma.
Additionally, the null results in this study could have resulted from the fact that construal
level simply does not affect mental illness stigma. As previously discussed, a discrepancy exists
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in the literature with some research citing that construal level increases stigma (McCrae et al.,
2012) and other research citing that construal level decreases stigma (Levy et al., 2002).
Although previous literature has examined how construal level impacts peoples’ negative
judgements towards other stigmatized groups (e.g. gay men and lesbians, people with AIDS,
people who are homeless,) it has never examined how construal level effects mental illness
stigma. Therefore, it is possible that mental illness stigma is different from other types of stigma.
Future research should clarify how mental illness stigma differs from other types of stigma.
Rural and Urban Differences
Another aim of this study was to examine rural versus urban stigma differences. In this
study, no differences in mental illness stigma were found between rural versus urban residents.
Although this data contrasts with Hoyt and Conger’s research (1997), it is consistent with data
from our laboratory (Gay, Losee, & Naufel, 2013). Specifically, we found no differences in
mental illness stigma (including self-stigma and public stigma) between rural and urban
residents. This current study and our previous study suggest that there may not be differences in
mental illness stigma between rural and urban areas. Additional research is needed to compare
rural and urban mental illness stigma, as much of the previous literature do not utilize
comparison groups. The belief that rural areas stigmatize mental illness more than urban areas
may serve as a barrier to help seeking behaviors. By assessing the actual prevalence of mental
illness stigma, in rural versus urban areas, a better understanding of the existence of stigma can
be constructed. An empirically derived understanding of the prevalence of rural versus urban
mental illness stigma could also serve to inform public policy, psychoeducation, and help in
developing interventions to decrease mental illness stigma.
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Perceived Similarity
Exploratory analyses revealed that as perceived similarity with a person with mental
illness decreases, negative attitudes toward individuals with mental illness increase. This finding
may give credence to the hypothesis that perceived similarity with a stigmatized group decreases
stigma (Levy et al., 2002). According to recatergoization theory, contact with out-group
members (e.g. people with mental illness) results in changes in out-group classification, from
“them” to meaningful relationships (Gaertner et al., 1990). Thus, perceived similarity with a
person with mental illness may suggest that the person with mental illness is given in-group
status, thus reducing stigma. Future research should explore the relationships between these
variables as the exact mechanism of contact reducing stigma is unknown (Binder et al, 2009).
Suggestions for Future Research
In sum, it is unclear if construal level affects mental illness stigma. Therefore, future
research is still needed to assess the effects of construal level and other mediating factors (e.g.
perceived similarity with a person with mental illness) on mental illness stigma. As previously
stated, a discrepancy exists in the literature, with some research citing that construal level
increases stigma (McCrae et al., 2012) and other research citing that construal level decreases
stigma (Levy et al., 2002). Future research should examine the utility of using the behavior
identification form as manipulation check for construal level priming. Although one study has
demonstrated the utility of the BIF as a construal level manipulation check (Belding, Naufel, and
Fujita, 2015), more research is needed. Perhaps other construal level tasks could also be utilized
as a manipulation check. For example, construal level could be primed utilizing the manipulation
by Liberman and Förster (2009) (e.g. abstract mindset primed by ignoring small letters and
respond to large letters; concrete mindset primed by ignoring large letters and responding to
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small letters) and Freitas et al.’s (2004) manipulation could be used as a manipulation check.
Future research should also utilize attention measures to ensure that adequate attention is
paid to construal level tasks. Participants in this present study may not have paid adequate
attention to the materials, thus minimizing the effectiveness of the priming. However, it is not
possible to test for this effect since effort measures were not utilized. It will be important to
address this flaw in the future by including such measures. For example, additional questions
could be utilized to ensure that participants adequately comprehended the instructions and
adequately attended to the tasks.
Next, future research should examine how mental illness stigma is similar or different
from other types of stigma, making it easier to evaluate these conflicting results. This could be
done by examining how stigma differs from other known stigmatized groups such as gays and
lesbians (Bridges et al., 2001). By assessing how mental illness stigma differs from other types
of stigma, it will be easier to establish interventions to decrease mental illness stigma, as well as
evaluate how well other types of anti-stigma campaigns generalize to mental illness stigma.
Lastly, additional research may help delineate the role of perceived similarity with a
person with mental illness and stigma. This study revealed that participants who perceived
themselves as being similar to a person with mental illness tended to endorse lower levels of
stigma toward individuals with mental illness. Although previous research has theorized that this
may be the case (Levy et al., 2002) little research has directly examined the role of perceived
similarity on mental illness stigma.
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Table 1
Sample Demographics
Gender

Frequency

Percent

Male

87

41.8

Female

121

58.2

Urban

89

42.8

Rural

119

57.2

18-19

129

62

20-21

61

29.3

22 or over

18

8.7

African American

79

38

Caucasian

106

51

Hispanic

6

2.9

Asian

4

1.9

Multiracial

9

4.3

Other

4

4.9

Catholic Christian

24

11.5

Protestant Christian

17

8.2

Other Christian

132

63.5

Atheist

8

3.8

Agnostic

9

4.3

Other

10

4.9

No Response

8

3.8

Residence

Age

Race

Religious Affiliation
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Table 2
AQ-27 Descriptive Statistics
Range

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Standard
Error

Std. Deviation

AQ-27 Factor
Blame
15.00
3.00
18.00
6.74
.25
3.64
Anger
24.00
3.00
27.00
7.91
.31
4.51
Pity
20.00
7.00
27.00
20.16
.33
4.73
Help
21.00
6.00
27.00
20.34
.33
4.74
Dangerousness 24.00
3.00
27.00
12.05
.39
5.65
Fear
24.00
3.00
27.00
10.55
.40
5.70
Segregation
21.00
3.00
24.00
9.57
.35
5.01
Coercion
22.00
5.00
27.00
16.14
.29
4.23
Avoidance
24.00
3.00
27.00
14.99
.40
5.84
Note. Each subscale has 3 items with each subscale having a possible range of 3 to 27.
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Table 3
The Relationship between Perceived Similarity with a Person with Mental Illness and Mental
Illness Stigma
AQ-27 Subscale
Blame

Pearson Correlation
Significance

IOS 1
-.13
.07

Anger

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.15
.04*

Pity

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.04
.53

Help

Pearson Correlation
Significance

.23
.001**

Dangerousness

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.15
.03*

Fear

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.17
.01**

Avoidance

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.30
.00**

Segregation

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.21
.00**

Coercion

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.29
.00**

Resource Allocation Task

Pearson Correlation
Significance

.01
.84

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the < 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*. Correlation is significant at the < 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Table 4
Hypothesis 1A Mediation Model
Perceived Similarity with a Person with Mental Illness as Mediator between Construal Level and
Mental Illness Stigma

AQ-27 Subscale

eta

95% Confidence
Interval (Lower
Limit)

95% Confidence
Interval (Higher
Limit)

Z

Significance
Test

Blame

-.04

-.07

.12

.53

.91

Anger

.21

-.09

.16

.55

.58

Pity

1.00

-.06

.08

.26

.80

Help

-.65

-.25

.13

-.59

.55

Dangerousness

.22

-.11

.20

.55

.58

Fear

.18

-.13

.23

.57

.57

Avoidance

.49

-.20

.39

.61

.54

Segregation

-.07

-.13

.24

.59

.56

Coercion

-.35

-.15

.28

.61

.54

Resource
Allocation Task
(Behavioral
Measure)

-.09

-.02

.02

-.09

.93
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Table 5
Hypothesis 1B Mediation Model
Perceived Similarity between Target and People with Schizophrenia as Mediator between
Construal Level and Mental Illness Stigma

AQ-27 Subscale

eta

95% Confidence
Interval (Lower
Limit)

95% Confidence
Interval (Higher
Limit)

Z

Significance
Test

Blame

.03

-.13

.05

-.81

.42

Anger

.21

-.07

.13

.65

.51

Pity

.96

-.07

.15

.77

.44

Help

-.68

-.13

.07

-.60

.55

Dangerousness

.24

-.09

.13

.36

.72

Fear

.20

-.09

.14

.43

.66

Avoidance

.53

-.08

.19

.75

.45

Segregation

-.06

-.07

.17

.79

.43

Coercion

-.33

-.06

.14

.78

.44

Resource
Allocation Task

-.07

-.06

.02

-1.03

.30
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Table 6
Pearson Correlations for BIF scores and Mental Illness Stigma Variables
AQ-27 Subscale
Blame

Pearson Correlation
Significance

BIF
.11
.10

Anger

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.08
.24

Pity

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.01
.85

Help

Pearson Correlation
Significance

.22
.001*

Dangerousness

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.04
.54

Fear

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.07
.31

Avoidance

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.08
.28

Segregation

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.40
.58

Coercion

Pearson Correlation
Significance

-.05
.47

Resource Allocation Task

Pearson Correlation
Significance

.08
.23

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the < 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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Appendix A
At the conclusion of this study, you will be given a chance to take part in a random drawing.
YOU will have a chance of WINNING $25 dollars if your participant number is selected. If you
win, you can choose to keep the money for yourself or donate some or all of it to the National
Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI). Please see the attached fact sheet, which describes NAMI
and then make your decision about how to allocate the money that you may win as a result of
participating in today’s experiment.
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What is NAMI?

NAMI is the National Alliance on Mental Illness, the nation’s largest grassroots
mental health organization dedicated to building better lives for the millions of
Americans affected by mental illness. NAMI advocates for access to services,
treatment, supports and research and is steadfast in its commitment to raise
awareness and build a community for hope for all of those in need. NAMI
members and friends work to fulfill their mission by providing support, education,
and advocacy for people affected by mental illness and their families.
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Please choose how you would like the money allocated if you win the random drawing:
(a)“$25 to me and $0 to NAMI,”
(b) “$15 to me and $10 to NAMI,”
(c) “$10 to me and $15 to the NAMI,”
(d) “$0 to me and $25 to the NAMI.”
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Appendix B
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Appendix C

INSTRUCTIONS: Using the diagrams below, indicate how similar that you feel Harry is to other people with
Schizophrenia.
CIRCLE a response.
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Appendix D
1. What is your gender?
____ Male
____ Female
2. Consider where you currently live. Does that place seem more rural or more urban?
____ rural
____ urban
3. Consider the place where you spent most of your childhood years. Does that place seem
more rural or urban?
____ urban
____ rural
4. What is your age? (in years) ____
5. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?
____ Less than high school degree
____ High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
____ Some college but no degree
____ Associate degree
____ Bachelor degree
____ Graduate degree
6. Have you ever visited a psychologist or other mental health professional?
____ Yes
____ No
____ I prefer not to respond
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7. Are you now married, widowed, divorced, separated, or never married?
____Married
____Widowed
____Divorced
____Separated
____Never married
8. What is your race? Check all that apply.
____American Indian or Alaskan Native
____Asian
____Black or African-American
____Hispanic
____Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
____White
____I prefer not to respond
____From multiple races
9. What is your religious affiliation?
____Atheist
____Agnostic
____Buddhist
____Catholic Christian
____Christian, other
____Jewish
____Muslim
____Hindu
____Protestant Christian
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____Other
____I prefer not to respond
10. How invested are you in your religious practices or to what extent does religion play a
major role in your life?
____Extremely Important
____Very Important
____Important
____Neutral
____Not important
11. Has a family member or a close friend sought help for emotional difficulties (or mental
illness?) ____

